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MODIFICATION OF LEASES BY AGREEMENT
TO REDUCE RENT
LESLM WHIDDEN
T has been commonly accepted as the law in Illinois
that a lessor's agreement to reduce the rent of an un-
expired lease is binding upon him to the extent that he
has already received and accepted as full payment the
lesser amount of rent. A number of cases in the appellate
courts of Illinois have so held. Except by way of dictum,
however, the Supreme Court of Illinois has not directly
decided the precise question. If it may be assumed that
the Supreme Court would render a decision on such a
problem, when presented therewith, on the basis of ac-
cepted principles of common law, the result might easily
be contrary to the present understanding. Not only are
the appellate court cases not in strict accord with com-
mon law principles, but they are inconsistent with similar
cases dealing with reduction of liquidated claims in other
than rent cases.1 While some other states likewise give
the lessee this special benefit which he would not be likely
to receive were he a debtor otherwise than as lessee, such
states are probably still in the minority.
It is not proposed here to commend the common law
for keeping a debtor bound in spite of an expressed will-
ingness of the creditor to forgive the debt. It is only in-
tended to show that the cases in which the lessee has been
so excused from payment of his debt, and which purport
to be based on accepted common law principles, are in
fact based on false logic.
Leases are sometimes under seal, sometimes simple
writings, sometimes verbal. While the parol evidence
1 Hart v. Strong, 183 Ill. 349, 55 N. E. 629 (1899) ; Morrill v. Baggott,
157 Ill. 240, 41 N. E. 639 (1895) ; Hayes v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 125 Ill. 626, 18 N. E. 322 (1888) ; Davidson v. Burke, 143 I1. 139, 32
N. E. 514 (1892) ; Farmers & Mechanics Life Ass'n v. Caine, 224 Ill. 599,
79 N. E. 956 (1907); Curtiss v. Martin, 20 Ill. 557 (1858) ; Kushner v.
Perlman, 189 11. App. 59 (1914).
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rule could not prevent a proper parol modification of a
prior written contract, it was a principle of the common
law that a sealed contract could not be varied by parol-
that a parol agreement to vary a contract under seal
could not be pleaded in a court of law to defeat a recovery
on the original undertaking. Coke stated the rule to be
that "when a duty accrues by the deed in certainty...
as by covenant, bill, or bond, to pay a sum of money,
there this certain duty takes its essence and operation
originally and solely by the writing; and therefore it
ought to be avoided by a matter of as high a nature .... "'
This rule was applied whether the modifying parol agree-
ment was executed or executory, for its basis lay in the
formality of the sealed contract; it was not applied to
simple written contracts.'
In some states the common law value of a seal has been
eliminated by statute,4 in others its effect is so modified
that a sealed instrument is only presumed, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, to have been made for suffi-
cient consideration and to be valid for that reason.5 In
states where the seal raises only a presumption that the
agreement is supported by consideration, that presump-
tion has been held to be rebuttable.' It has been sug-
gested that the latter result has been reached in Illinois.'
The cases seeming to uphold this conclusion depend upon
the Illinois Negotiable Instruments statute of 1874,'
2 Blake's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 43b, 77 Eng. Rep. 319 (1605); Rogers v.
Payne, 2 Wils. K.B. 376, 95 Eng. Rep. 871 (1768).
3 Hayford v. Andrews, Cro. Eliz. 697, 78 Eng. Rep. 932 (1599).
4 Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed., 1936), I, 659-662, § 218, and cases
there cited.
5 Ibid.
6 In re McLaughlin's Estate, 182 Mich. 707, 151 N. W. 745 (1915)
Gardner v. Watson, 170 Cal. 570, 150 P. 994 (1915).
7 Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed., 1936), I, 660, § 218: "In Illinois under
a statute of different form a similar result has been reached."
8 11. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 98, 10. "In any action upon a note,
bond, bill, or other instrument in writing, for the payment of money or
property, or the performance of covenants or conditions, if such instrument
was made or entered into without a good and valuable consideration, or, if
the consideration upon which it was made or entered into has wholly or in
part failed, it shall be lawful for the defendant to plead such a want of
consideration, or that the consideration has wholly or in part failed. .. ."
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which was broad enough in its language to appear to
apply to all instruments. The statute has, however, been
construed by the Illinois Supreme Court 9 to apply only
to negotiable instruments; and it has been said by the
Illinois Supreme Court, referring to the same words in
an older statute (1827) that "a lease although it may be,
in part, for the payment of money, or for the perform-
ance of covenants, is not such an instrument in writing
as is contemplated by the statute.""°
It follows that where the seal, having lost its common
law value, does not add dignity to an instrument, a mod-
ifying agreement, though not under seal, is "matter of
as high a nature" and so is effective if otherwise valid.
This result should, strictly, not follow where the seal has
retained its value, but the tendency has been to permit
modification of sealed instruments by agreements not
under seal even in such jurisdictions."'
In Illinois parol agreements to modify sealed instru-
ments have been upheld where executed. 2 An executory
parol agreement apparently is no more effective now to
modify a sealed contract if the seal retains its common
law value than it was in the time of Coke. 3
However, to say that it is only where the parol agree-
ment is executed that it will be effective to modify the
sealed contract does not necessarily mean that an ex-
ecuted parol agreement will always be effective. Even
in cases where the prior contract is not under seal, the
modifying parol agreement, being in effect a new con-
tract, requires for its validity a new consideration to
support it. The consideration need not be adequate to
the promise but must be of some value in the eye of the
9 Chicago Sash Mfg. Co. v. Haven, 195 Il. 474, 63 N. E. 158 (1902).
10 Dunbar v. Bonesteel, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 32 (1841).
11 Tuson v. Crosby, 172 Mass. 478, 52 N. E. 744 (1899); Hamilton v.
Hart, 109 Pa. St. 629 (1885); Hydeville Co. v. Eagle R. R. & Slate Co., 44
Vt. 395 (1872).
12 Worrell v. Forsyth, 141 Ill. 22, 30 N. E. 673 (1892); Gum v. Tibbs,
134 I1. App. 280 (1907); Warder, Bushnell & Glessner Co. v. Arnold, 75 Ill.
App. 674 (1897).
Is Chapman, use, etc. v. McGrew, 20 Ill. 101 (1858).
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law. 4 The question is not the amount of consideration
but whether there was any,15 and it must have been with-
in the contemplation of the parties at the time of modifi-
cation. That the new agreement for some reason not
anticipated by the parties becomes beneficial to one of
them does not raise a consideration to support his prom-
ise to perform.'"
Because the modifying agreement is a new and sepa-
rate contract, its consideration must be in addition to
that which supported the original contract, for the debtor
incurs no legal detriment by doing part or all of what he
is already bound to do, nor does the creditor thereby re-
ceive a legal benefit." So where a liquidated sum of
money is due, a promise by the creditor to discharge the
whole debt in return for payment of part of the amount
due is not binding because not supported by considera-
tion.18
The requirement of consideration in settlement of
liquidated claims has been attacked by law writers 9 and
some states have by statute made payment of part of a
debt a valid discharge of the whole if such is the intent
of the parties." A marked attempt has been made on the
part of the courts to relax the requirement in rent cases,
and this has been effected by declaring consideration to
be present where in the usual sense there is none, by find-
ing an estoppel or a waiver, by stating that execution of
14 Anson on Contracts (Callaghan & Co., 1887), Part II, Ch. II, § 4, p. 88.
15 White v. Walker, 31 Ill. 422 (1863).
16 Loach v. Farnum, 90 Ill. 368 (1878).
17 McKinley v. Watkins, 13 11. 140 (1851); Barnett v. Barnes, 73 Ii.
216 (1874) ; Loach v. Farnum, 90 Ill. 368 (1878) ; Goldsborough v. Gable,
140 Ill. 269, 29 N. E. 722 (1892).
Is Cochran v. Nat. Casualty Co., 261 Mich. 273, 246 N. W. 87 (1933);
Aston v. Elkow, 271 N. W. 742 (Mich., 1937) ; Williston on Contracts (Rev.
ed., 1936), I, 415, § 120 and cases there cited. This has been the unques-
tioned rule in Illinois in other than rent cases. Hayes v. Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 125 Ill. 626, 18 N. E. 322 (1888); Knights Templars & Masons
Indemnity Co. v. Crayton, 209 Ill. 550, 70 N. E. 1066 (1904); Farmers &
Mechanics Life Ass'n v. Caine, 224 Ill. 599, 79 N. E. 956 (1906) ; Wood-
bury v. U. S. Casualty Co., 284 Ill. 227, 120 N. E. 8 (1918) ; Janci v. Cerny,
287 Ill. 359, 122 N. E. 507 (1919).
19 Ames, "Two Theories of Consideration," 12 Harv. L. Rev. 515 (1899).
20 Ga. Code, 4329; Me. Rev. Stat., Ch. 84, 59; Va. Code, 2858.
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the parol agreement ends inquiry into the question of
consideration, and by considering a receipt in full as a
gift of the unpaid balance.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in 193421 affirmed its
decision in Ten Eyck v. Sleeper,22 stating that "the great
and unforeseen depression (1893), resulting in the lessee's
inability to pay, and the probability that the premises
would become vacant, impaired in value and not readily
rentable, would constitute consideration for an agree-
ment for reduced rental." Such consideration is, to say
the least, unconventional. There is no new detriment to
the promisee nor additional legal benefit to the promisor,
for the result of the new agreement, if it is carried out,
is that the lessee has paid for the use of the premises
only part of the rent which he was by the terms of the
lease bound to pay, while the lessor receives nothing to
which he was not already entitled. There is nothing more
here to support the lessor's promise to reduce the rent
than a promise by the lessee that he will do part of what
he was already bound to do.
Occasionally a modification of a sealed contract will be
upheld on the ground of estoppe! 8 And whether it is
termed equitable or promissory estoppel, this is probably
the only correct basis for giving effect to the modifica-
tion, by parol, of a sealed contract. This will explain why
it is that an executed parol agreement modifying a sealed
contract will be given effect to preclude a recovery on
the original contract, while an executory parol agree-
ment will not. If one owing a duty under a sealed con-
tract is led by verbal agreement with the other party to
the contract to give a substituted or altered performance,
it would be a harsh law that would allow the recipient of
such performance to demand as well the performance for
21 Win. Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 252 N. W. 650
(1934).
22 65 Minn. 413, 67 N. W. 1026 (1893).
28 White v. Walker, 31 111. 422 (1863); Warder, B. & G. Co. v. Arnold,
75 Ill. App. 674 (1897) ; Yockey v. Marion, 269 Ill. 342, 110 N. E. 34 (1915).
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which he contracted. But if the parol agreement is exec-
utory, it may be held ineffective without any injustice,
since neither party has changed his position in reliance
thereon. This is true whether there is or is not consider-
ation for the verbal agreement. And the same principles
underlie the decisions recognizing the effect of a verbal
waiver of a condition required by a sealed contract. 4
In the case of estoppel, as in the case of consideration,
however, it is not correct to say that just because the mod-
ification will only be effective where the parol agreement
is executed, it will always be effective when executed. It
should be held effective only in those cases of executed
agreements where one party to a contract has been led
into a prejudicial position in reliance upon the promises
or statements of the other. No estoppel will arise when
the party acting upon a representation does only what he
was legally bound to do.25 So where a lessee, relying
upon the promise of the lessor that he will accept less
rent, pays the lesser sum, he is doing only what he was
already obliged by the terms of the lease to do. This is
not, then, such a change of position as would require the
doctrine of equitable estoppel or promissory estoppel to
be invoked. Hence, without consideration and without an
estoppel, an agreement to modify either a sealed or an
unsealed contract would not be entitled to recognition,
whether it had or had not been executed.
It is conceivable that if a lessor agrees to accept a
smaller sum and does accept it, he should be precluded
from asserting that there was such a breach as would
entitle him to forfeit the lease under a clause giving him
that right in case of nonpayment of rent, and he might
likewise be precluded from claiming interest on the un-
paid balance, 6 but he should not be precluded from de-
24 Becker v. Becker, 250 I1. 117, 95 N. E. 70 (1911) ; Chicago & Eastern
Illinois R. Co. v. Moran, 187 Ill. 316, 58 N. E. 335 (1900).
25 Bigelow on Estoppel (Little, Brown & Co., 3rd ed., 1882), 550; Organ
v. Stewart, 60 N. Y. 413 (1875).
26 Cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Compania Mexicana de Petroleo, 66 F. (2d)
390 (1933).
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manding the balance of the rent unpaid.27 The lessee is
not in a worse position legally because of a delay on the
part of the lessor in enforcing his right,2 8 except insofar
as the lessor might demand damages for delay. The
delay might be excused, therefore, but not the debt itself.
Nor is the situation aided by considering the unpaid
portion of the rent waived, for while a condition which
furnishes no material part of the consideration or ex-
change value may be waived, even in cases of sealed con-
tracts,2 9 "an agreement by parol cannot dispense with an
obligation." 30 Again, the payment on the precise day it
is due may, as a condition, be waived and such waiver
may be treated as a continuing license to delay payment,
which license may be revoked at any time with reasonable
notice3 1 but this is quite a different matter from waiving a
debt. An attempted waiver of a debt is something akin to
a discharge of a debt by exoneration before breach. Ex-
oneration, a parol discharge without consideration, was
recognized in some early English cases, 2 but has gen-
erally not been regarded as the law in this country, 3 and
apparently never applied to sealed instruments. 4
Occasionally a court flatly states that where the agree-
ment to reduce the amount of rent required by a lease
has been executed on both sides, there can be no inquiry
into the question of consideration. In Brackett Company
v. Lofgren,3 for example, the court said:
27 See Williston on Contracts, § 690, 1831.
28 Thomson v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 402, 42 N. E. 13 (1895) ; Williams v.
Wheeler, 8 C.B. (N. S.) 299 (1860); Plevins v. Downing, 1 C.P.D. 220
(1876).
29 Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 528 (1808), and cases there cited.
30 Hayford v. Andrews, Cro. Eliz. 697 (1599); Williston on Contracts
(Ist ed.), II, 1336, § 690; Ibid. (Rev. ed.), III, 1992, § 690; A.L.I. Restate-
ment of the Law of Contracts, § 297, comment (c).
31 First Lutheran Church v. Rooks Creek Evangelical Lutheran Church,
316 Ill. 196, 147 N. E. 53 (1925) ; Fox v. Grange, 261 Il1. 116, 103 N. E. 576
(1913) ; Williston on Contracts (Ist ed.), II, 1334-5, § 689; Ibid. (Rev. ed.),
III, 1990, § 689; A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Contracts, §§ 88 (1),
297, 308.
32 Williston on Contracts (Ist ed.), III, 3150, § 1830 and cases cited, n. 43.
33 Ibid., II, 3152, § 1831 and cases cited, n. 52.
84 Ibid., II, 3159, § 1836, and cases cited, n. 81.
35 140 Minn. 52, 167 N. W. 274 (1918).
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After an agreement has been fully executed on both sides the
question of consideration becomes immaterial .... This lease was
executory at the time the agreement to reduce the rent was made.
The parties saw fit to execute it on both sides, in accordance with
the modified terms, for the period in controversy. To the extent
that it was so executed it became a closed incident, and the
amount rebated cannot now be recovered.
The Minnesota court cited in support of its decision the
Illinois case of Snow v. Griesheimer,6 where it was said,
So long as the contract contained in the lease under seal remained
executory, the plaintiff had a right to repudiate the parol agree-
ment and claim the full amount of rent contracted for. The rule
of law, however, is one that defeats the intention of the parties,
and while it should be enforced in every case to which it applies,
it is not to be extended to other cases to which it does not prop-
erly apply. If the parties have executed the contract as modified,
.. the contract as executed will not be disturbed.
But in Snow v. Griesheimer there was a bona fide dispute
as to the amount of rent due. The dispute arose out of
an agreement to reduce the rent in consideration of re-
pairs to be made by the tenant. Hence, there was a com-
promise and settlement with adequate consideration.
Such cases as Bracket Company v. Lofgren apparently
ignore the fact that while the modifying agreement may
be executed on both sides by the lessor's permitting the
lessee to remain in possession and by the lessee's paying
the reduced rent called for by the new agreement, still
the original lease has not been, and could not be sup-
planted by the new agreement, because the latter is in-
valid for lack of consideration in that the lessee has
suffered no detriment in performing only in part the re-
quirements to which the lease bound him.
The original lease still stands unless it has in some way
been rescinded. If by action of the parties it has been
cancelled, so that neither party is bound, for however
short a time, and then a new agreement with a lesser rent
is made in place of it, the mutual promises in the new
agreement are sufficient consideration to support the new
86 220 I1. 106, 77 N. E. 110 (1906).
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agreement and it will stand in place of the old contract.87
But if the new agreement was merely a modification of
the old contract, then there must, to support it, be some
new legal consideration, for if the lessee pays less and
suffers no detriment and the lessor making the same per-
formance secures no legal benefit, there is no rescission,
and regardless of whether the new agreement is executed,
it has not changed the original agreement which is still
unexecuted. "The rule still obtains in the majority of
the states that the payment by the debtor and the receipt
by the creditor of a part of a liquidated demand is not a
satisfaction of the whole, although the creditor agrees to
accept it as such," 8 and so are the holdings in other than
rent cases.
On principle the second agreement is invalid for the performance
by the recalcitrant contractor is no legal detriment to him
whether actually given or promised, since, at the time the second
agreement was entered into, he was already bound to do the
work; nor is the performance under the second agreement a legal
benefit to the promisor since he was already entitled to have the
work done. In such situations and others identical in principle,
the great weight of authority supports this conclusion.3 9
Nor can the modification of the lease be upheld on the
ground of accord and satisfaction, for the amount of rent
due is specified in the lease; hence, it is liquidated and
cannot be in dispute, lacking the presence of some collat-
eral circumstances ° which would in itself furnish con-
sideration. For, as was said by Ellenborough, "There
must be some consideration for the relinquishment of the
residue; something collateral, to shew a possibility of
37 See Noble v. Ward, L. R. 1 Exch. 117 (1865), where the court made it
clear that both parties must be free from contractual obligations before a
new contract, reducing the obligation of one party, is made. For where it is
agreed to cancel a contract and make a new one giving one party an added
advantage in return for the same performance to which the other party was
already bound the parties are never free from the original obligation. For
a recent case wherein the court failed to recognize this, see Long Mer-
cantile Co. v. Saffron, 104 S. W. (2d) 770 (Mo. App., 1937).
38 1 R.C.L. 184, § 15.
89 Williston on Contracts (1st ed.), I, 275, § 130; Ibid. (Rev. ed.), I,
443, § 130, and cases cited, n. 3.
40 White v. Walker, 31 Ill. 422 (1863) ; Snow v. Griesheimer, 220 Ill. 106,
77 N. E. 110 (1906).
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benefit to the party relinquishing his further claim, other-
wise the agreement is nudum pactum. 4'1 And in the re-
cently decided case of Aston v. Elkow,42 the Michigan
court said, "We have many times held that part payment
of a past-due, liquidated, and undisputed claim, even
though accepted in full satisfaction thereof, does not. op-
erate to discharge the debt, but constitutes a discharge
pro tanto only.'"
The rule that payment of part cannot discharge the
whole debt even though the creditor agrees, while sup-
ported by the weight of authority," has in some jurisdic-
tions been changed by decision 5 and in others by stat-
ute." However, though criticized, the rule has the virtue
of consistency.
It has also been stated that the amount by which the
rent has been reduced is a gift. 7 It is interesting to fol-
low the course of the Illinois cases in this respect. In
Goldsborough v. Gable," where a parol agreement to
reduce the rent called for by a lease under seal had been
executed, the Supreme Court, in speaking of the oral
agreement to reduce the rent called for by the lease, said:
It simply purports to obligate appellee to pay and appellant to
receive $50, where they were already obligated, the one to pay
and the other to receive $70. There is, thereby, neither in fact nor
in presumption of law, injury or loss to appellee, or gain or
benefit to appellant. It follows that it is an agreement, as clearly
as one can be, without any consideration to support it,-a mere
41 Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East 230, 102 Eng. Rep. 1058 (1804).
42 271 N. W. 742 (Mich., 1937).
43 See also Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231, 33 N. E. 1034 (1893); Laroe
v. Sugar Loaf Dairy Co., 180 N. Y. 367, 73 N. E. 61 (1905); Galowitz v.
Hendlin, 150 N.Y.S. 641 (1914) ; L.R.A. 1917A 719, note; 21 L.R.A. (N. S.)
1005, note; 11 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1018, note; 20 L.R.A. 785, note.
44 Williston on Contracts (1st ed.), I, 257, § 120, n. 41; Ibid., (Rev. ed.),
I, 415, § 120, n. 3, and cases there cited.
45 Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499, 21 So. 565, 22 So. 189 (1897); Frye v.
Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, 68 A. 325 (1907).
46 Georgia, Maine, Virginia, California.
47 McKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N. Y. 260, 24 N. E. 458 (1890); Zindler
v. Levitt, 116 N. Y. S. 726 (1909); Holmes v. Holmes, 129 Mich. 412, 89
N. W. 47, 95 Am. St. Rep. 444 (1902); Leddel's Executors v. Starr, 20
N. J. Eq. 274 (1869).
48 140 Ill. 269, 29 N. E. 722 (1892).
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nudum pactum; and so it is binding upon neither of the parties,
and is unsusceptible of being enforced in this suit. .... It is
impossible to say that the agreement was made as an adjustment
of a dispute in regard to a doubtful right, for appellee's own
testimony shows that there was no fact in dispute between him
and appellant. His testimony is only that he claimed that the
rent should be reduced and that appellant resisted the claim at
first, but finally yielded to the extent shown by the agreement.
It cannot be held that appellant is in any way estopped by the
agreement, since it is not shown that appellee has, in consequence
of it, done that which he would otherwise not have done, whereby
he will be injured if the agreement be not carried out. Nor can
it be held that the agreement has the effect of an executed gift
as to the difference between the $50 and the $70 per month, be-
cause there was executed no receipt or release for the amount,
and there was no proof of any action of the parties equivalent
thereto.
Since, as pointed out by the court, the question of the
result in case there had been receipts in full or a release
was not in issue, no receipts or release having been given,
whatever the court said on that point was dictum. Even
so, it would be logical to presume that the court meant
such a receipt or release as would be effective at com-
mon law, that is to say, under seal.49
The IMinoi- Appellate Court, in Doyle v. D'urne,5 ° said:
That Dunne is liable in this action for the difference between the
amount he has paid and the amount reserved by the lease, is
deduced by the plaintiff's counsel from the doctrine of such cases
as Loach v. Farnum, 90 Ill. 368, and Goldsborough v. Gable, 140
Ill. 269, which hold that a parol agreement to reduce rent, entered
into by a lessor without consideration, is a mere nudum pactum,
not binding, and not susceptible of being enforced; from such
cases as Chapman v. MeGrew, 20 Ill. 101; Alschuler v. Schiff,
164 Ill. 298; and Ryan v. Cooke, 172 Ill. 302, which hold that an
instrument under seal cannot be modified by parol, and from
those cases which hold that the payment of a less sum where a
greater liquidated and undisputed sum is due, is nof a -satisfaction
of, the greater sum.
49 Release not under seal has been held ineffective in Farmers & Mechan-
ics Life Ass'n v. Caine, 224 Ill. 599, 79 N. E. 956 (1907); Benjamin v.
McConnell, 4 Gilm. (Ill.) 536 (1847).
50 144 Ill. App. 14 (1908).
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But as the Supreme Court noted in Snow v. Griesheimer, 220
Ill. 106, the rules of law thus laid down, even in executory con-
tracts, defeat the intention of the parties and should not be un-
duly extended.
And in the cases cited on leases the doctrine is simply that so
long as the contract contained in the lease under seal remained
executory, the plaintiff had a right to repudiate the parol agree-
ment and claim the full amount of rent contracted for, while in
the Snow case the converse is explicitly recognized, that "If the
parties have executed the contract as modified, so that nothing
remains to be done by either party, it is no longer executory and
the contract as executed will not be disturbed." . ..And the
opinion in Goldsborough v. Gable suggests the difference between
that case and the present one, and the ground on which the final-
ity of the settlement of rent charges between the parties in the
case at bar should be sustained, when it says: "Nor can it be held
that the agreement has the effect of an executed gift as to the
difference between the $50 and the $70 per month, because there
was executed no receipt or release for the amount, and there was
no proof of any action equivalent thereto." . . . It is the actual
executed waiver and release of the difference in the rents, not the
"agreement" made without consideration, which was thus sus-
tained as a gift by the trial judge when he declined in a suit
begun almost a year after the contract of lease had terminated
and expired by its terms, and the accordant surrender of the
premises, to hold the lessee liable for money from the payment
of which the evident intention and understanding of the parties
-as understood by both of them-was that he should be and had
been released.
But as already pointed out, the executed modifying
agreement in the Snow case rested on sound considera-
tion, that is, the making of repairs by the tenant in re-
turn for the reduction in rent, and the statement in
Goldsborough v. Gable regarding receipts and releases
was dictum, and may not have meant a receipt or release
not under seal.
In Levy v. Greenberg,51 the Appellate Court, referring
to the Snow, Goldsborough, and Doyle cases, said, "... . we
are disposed to regard the reductions in rental as gifts
of separate and distinct items each month, and when the
51 261 Ill. App. 541 (1931).
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same were paid and accepted, we believe the gift in each
case is complete and irrevocable ... "
In Hymen v. Anschicks,52 the Appellate Court again
said, "It is well settled that an executed parol agree-
ment may be shown to defeat a recovery upon an instru-
ment under seal. Yockey v. Marion, 269 Ill. 342; Snow v.
Greisheimer, 220 Ill. 106; Worrell v. Forsyth, 141 Ill. 22;
Doyle v. Dunn, 144 Ill. App. 14."
In the Yockey case where a bill was filed to construe a
will and an antenuptial contract, the court said,
An executed parol agreement may be shown to defeat a recov-
ery upon the instrument under seal, and although the parol agree-
ment may have been without consideration it may become a basis
for an equitable estoppel, if by means of it one of the parties has
been led into a line of conduct prejudicial to his interests if the
contract should be enforced.
But it will be noticed that the Supreme Court did not say
that every executed parol agreement without considera-
tion may be shown to defeat a recovery upon an instru-
ment under seal, as apparently was assumed by the Ap-
pellate Court in the Hymen case, for the court in the
Yockey case merely said that such agreement might be-
come the basis for an equitable estoppel; and as has been
shown already no estoppel can arise from payment of
what is already due. Likewise in the Worrell case, also
relating to an antenuptial agreement, the court stated
only that a parol agreement if executed could defeat re-
covery upon a sealed instrument if an equitable estoppel
had arisen by the reliance of one of the parties thereon
in moving to his detriment. The Snow and Doyle cases
have already been considered.
It is apparent, then, that the appellate court decisions
are based on particular phrases taken from the Supreme
Court cases and not on Supreme Court decisions. In the
only Supreme Court case intimating that the unpaid por-
tion of the rent might be made the subject of a gift by
delivery of a receipt in full, the statement was dictum.
52 270 Ill. App. 202 (1933).
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The statement was not even in affirmative language. The
court did not say that if a receipt in full had been given
it would have constituted a gift and therefore it was not
called upon to state what kind of a receipt-sealed or
unsealed-would have such effect.
Let it be conceded that it might be desirable to permit
a discharge by a receipt not under seal, still the common
law knew no such discharge, nor would the common law
have given effect to it as a gift. At common law, title to
a chose in action could be passed only by deed.53 While
gifts of choses in action have been recognized without a
formal written assignment in modern times, it will be
found on inspection of the cases that this is, in general,
true only in cases where the right of action is embodied
in an instrument in writing which gives the possessor
control of the chose in action and where the obligor has a
right to the surrender of the instrument as a condition to
his payment.5 In such cases the gift may be made where
there is a donative intent by a delivery of such instru-
ment to the donee. A receipt is not a deed which can pass
title, it is not such an instrument as embodies the debt-
like a stock certificate, bond, or note of a third person,
nor is the obligor's duty so conditioned upon the delivery
of such a writing that possession thereof might be said
to give the possessor exclusive control of the debt. A
receipt is merely a statement of fact, made by the credi-
tor, which he is not estopped to dispute. Since it is an
informal, non-depositive writing, it may be modified, ex-
plained, or contradicted by parol.55 Nor does this violate
the parol evidence rule, which protects only the state-
58 Irons v. Smallpiece, 2 B. & A. 551, 106 Eng. Rep. 467 (1819) ; Willis-
ton on Contracts (1st ed.), I, 257, §, 120; Ibid. (Rev. ed.), I, 416, § 120,
and cases there cited.
54 Hopkins v. Manchester, 16 R. I. 663, 19 A. 243, 7 L. R. A. 387 (1889);
Cook v. Lum, 55 N. J. L. 373, 26 A. 803 (1893); Mangan v. Howard, 238
Mass. 1, 130 N. E. 76 (1921); Philip Mechem, "Gifts of Corporation
Shares," 20 Ill. L. Rev. 9 (1925).
55 Komp v. Raymond, 175 N. Y. 102, 67 N. E. 113 (1903); Murphy v.
Halleran, 50 Ill. App. 594 (1893) ; Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 123
Ill. App. 202 (1905) ; Gillett v. Wiley, 126 Il. 310, 19 N. E. 287 (1888).
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ment of a promise, not the statement of a fact.56 So the
common law rule remains that if the unpaid debt is to be
considered released, the release must be under seal,57 and
it would seem that the requirement of a seal must still
be complied with except in those jurisdictions where a
seal has lost its value.58 If the receipt is sealed, it could
be given the effect of a release.5 9 If it is unsealed it must
be supported by consideration, and the consideration
must be something more than a payment of part only of
what is already due.6
It has been demonstrated that according to established
principles of common law a contract can be modified only
by another contract, which requires as one of its ele-
ments legal consideration, or if it be a deed, by an instru-
ment also under seal in jurisdictions where, as in Illinois,
the seal still has its common law efficacy. Consequently,
a promise to change the amount of rent due under a lease
should, depending on the nature of the lease, be sup-
ported by a new consideration or be under seal.
Although it be granted that they have the power to do
so, are the courts justified in changing or ignoring these
principles to effect what they consider a desired result?
While apparent justice may be done in some cases by en-
forcing a subsequent unsupported promise, does such
result justify creating inconsistency and uncertainty in
56 Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N. E. 352 (1889) ;
McCourt v. Peppard, 126 Wis. 326, 105 N. W. 809 (1905) ; Stewart v.
Chicago & E. I. R. Co., 141 Ind. 55, 40 N. E. 67 (1895). But see Sey-
ferth v. Groves & S. R. R. Co., 217 Ill. 483, 75 N. E. 522 (1905), holding a
refusal to take a dollar consideration when tendered equivalent to payment
and that the option was binding despite a subsequent revocation.
57 Davidson v. Burke, 143 I1. 139, 32 N. E. 514 (1892) ; Farmers &
Mechanics Life Ass'n v. Caine, 224 I1. 599, 79 N. E. 956 (1907) ; Benjamin
v. McConnell, 4 Gilm. (Ill.) 536 (1847).
58 Wabash Western Ry. v. Brow, 65 F. 941, (1895); Winter v. Kansas
City Cable Ry. Co., 160 Mo. 159, 61 S. W. 606 (1900).
59 Jackson v. Sec. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 233 11. 161, 84 N. E. 198 (1908).
60 Foakes v. Beer, L.R. 9 A.C. 605 (1884); Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co.
v. Clark, 178 U. S. 353, 44 L. Ed. 1099 (1900) ; Knights Templars & Masons
Life Indemnity Co. v. Crayton, 209 Ill. 550, 70 N. E. 1066 (1904) ; Farmers
& Mechanics Life Ass'n v. Caine, 224 Ill. 599, 79 N. E. 956 (1906) ; Janci v.
Cerny, 287 Il. 359, 122 N. E. 507 (1919) ; Curtiss v. Martin, 20 Ill. 557
(1858).
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the law? Over a long period of time there has evolved a
method of protecting parties to contracts and donors and
donees of gifts. If one intends to change his contract,
why should he not observe the established laws of con-
tracts, and if his intention be to make a gift, why should
he not observe the customary legal procedure for that
purpose? If it be said that laymen are not acquainted
with legal requirements and that the courts should pro-
tect them against their legal mistakes, it might be sug-
gested that one function of the lawyer is to advise.
Where a rule of law has been long established, courts
are usually reluctant to abolish it unless changing condi-
tions have clearly eliminated the reason for the rule. The
theory of consideration is the reason on which depends
the rule that an undisputed, liquidated debt cannot be
cancelled by payment of part alone. It follows that be-
fore the rule could be considered eliminated, one must
first admit the false premise that the theory of considera-
tion itself has been abandoned.
In Illinois where the seal has, except as to negotiable
instruments, retained its common law value, an adequate
modification may be made with ease by committing the
new agreement to writing and following the signature by
the word " Seal." Why not take advantage of the sim-
plicity thus afforded by requiring in this state that modi-
fication of a sealed instrument be under seal, and that a
writing not under seal be modified either by an instru-
ment under seal or by a parol agreement supported by
legal consideration, or at least an estoppel, and so do
away with the confusion and uncertainty attendant upon
the task of trying to find consideration where there is
none, or a gift or release where none was legally made,
or perhaps even intended? It is to be hoped that a
Supreme Court decision directly on the point may soon
clarify the situation.
